

FINE-GRAINED AND CONTROLLED REWRITING IN BLOCKCHAINS

Chameleon Hashing Gone Attribute-Based

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RESEARCH IN DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS TECHNOLOGIES

- Massive progress beyond Bitcoin, very hyped in recent years
- Signs that hype is turning into extensive research within the *cryptographic* community
 - (Cryptographic) research centers are established
- Many Cryptographic building blocks are applied to DLs
 - zk-SNARKs, Multi-Signatures, Verifiable Random Functions/Delay Functions/Secret Sharing, Threshold Signatures, Multi-Party Computation, ...
- Less research is known on rewriting DLs ...

» ... wait, isn't that counterintuitive?

IMMUTABLE DATA IN THE BLOCKCHAIN



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Sources: reddit.com; marketwatch.com; theguardian.com

IMMUTABLE DATA IN THE BLOCKCHAIN





Asia Australia Middle East Africa Inequality Cities Global development

Child abuse imagery found within bitcoin's blockchain

Researchers discover illegal content within the distributed ledger, making possession of it potentially unlawful in many countries



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JUST DO A HARD FORK ...

• Simple solution: **hard forks**, but *not* really useful (i.e., chain from change point has to be "re-written")





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In this work, focus is on transaction-level rewriting.

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PROTOTYPE OF EDITABLE BLOCKCHAINS

SEPTEMBER 20, 2016

Accenture Debuts Prototype of 'Editable' Blockchain for Enterprise and Permissioned Systems

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wrong and to meet new and changing regulatory and legal requirements, like the 'right to be forgotten' and other data-privacy and retention rules. An editable form of blockchain will make the technology more practical and useful for enterprise systems and accelerate its adoption. It combines the confidence that comes from immutability with the pragmatism required in an imperfect world."

"The clever work of the bitcoin creators and leaps of progress in applied cryptographic research are opening the door to bold new uses of blockchain," said Dr. Giuseppe Ateniese, a leading

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CHAMELEON HASHING

Finding collisions for hash functions (if you know a trapdoor)





PRIMER: CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS





"Fingerprint"

... but only if **td** is unknown.

CHAMELEON HASH (CH) FUNCTIONS



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 - On-/offline digital signatures, tightly secure signatures, sanitizable signatures, identity-based encryption, direct anonymous attestation, distributed hashing, and in editable blockchains



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 - On-/offline digital signatures, tightly secure signatures, sanitizable signatures, identity-based encryption, direct anonymous attestation, distributed hashing, and in editable blockchains
- **Problem:** coarse-grained, if one is in possession of the trapdoor *td*, all security guarantees are lost

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MAIN RESULT: POLICY-BASED CHAMELEON HASHING A new primitive for **fine-grained** hash-collision finding





• Enhances Chameleon Hashing with **attributes** and **access structure/policies**



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Mimics **fine-grained** collision finding for **chameleon hashing** *and* **strong security guarantees**.





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INSTANTIATING PBCH

Combining Chameleon Hashing (with Ephemeral Trapdoors) and Attribute-Based Encryption



INGREDIENT 1: CHAMELEON HASHING WITH EPHEMERAL TRAPDOORS (CHET)



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Security guarantee: looks random without knowing secret keys





Security guarantee: looks random without knowing secret keys





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INGREDIENT 2: ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION (ABE)

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Security guarantee: looks random without knowing secret keys





PUTTING EVERYTHING TOGETHER



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- $\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Gen}(k): \text{ Outputs the secret key } sk_{\mathsf{PBCH}} &\leftarrow (msk_{\mathsf{ABE}}, sk_{\mathsf{CHET}}) \text{ and public key} \\ pk_{\mathsf{PBCH}} &\leftarrow (pk_{\mathsf{ABE}}, pk_{\mathsf{CHET}}). \end{aligned}$
- $\mathsf{Key}(sk_{\mathsf{PBCH}}, S)$: Outputs a secret key $sk_S \leftarrow (sk_{\mathsf{CHET}}, sk_{\mathsf{ABE},S})$.
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 $\mathsf{Verify}(pk_{\mathsf{PBCH}}, m, h, r): \text{ Return 1 if } \mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{CHET}}(pk_{\mathsf{CHET}}, h, h_{\mathsf{CHET}}, r_{\mathsf{CHET}}), \text{ else 0.}$

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Ephemeral trapdoor *etd* can only be accessed with ABE **secret key for attributes** which fulfill **the ciphertext access structure**.

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HIGH-LEVEL EXAMPLE





CONCLUSION

- Editing/re-writing DLs interesting aspect to consider
 - Possible on block level and transaction level
- New primitive Policy-Based Chameleon Hashing (PBCH) to allow fine-grained rewriting on the transaction level in DLs
- Open questions
 - Who generates the trapdoor for chameleon hashes?
 - Ateniese et al. propose to use multi-party computation protocol
 - Can we get rid of such a requirement and build a fully decentralized solution based on chameleon hashing?



THANK YOU! Daniel.Slamanig@ait.ac.at



