

## Solutions to Homework 14

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Due: 23.59 CET, Jan 28, 2019

## 1. Naor's Transformation: Signatures from Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)

- **(2 Points)** In the lecture, we have sketched the Naor transformation. Provide a formal description of the signature scheme  $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vrfy})$  with message space  $\mathcal{M}_\Sigma$  resulting from applying the Naor transform to an IBE scheme  $\Xi = (\text{IBE}.\text{Gen}, \text{IBE}.\text{Ext}, \text{IBE}.\text{Enc}, \text{IBE}.\text{Dec})$  with identity space  $\mathcal{ID}_\Xi$  and message space  $\mathcal{M}_\Xi$ . Show the correctness of  $\Sigma$ .

**Solution:** Set  $\mathcal{M}_\Sigma := \mathcal{ID}_\Xi$ . Further, define

- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$  : for security parameter  $1^n$ , return  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{IBE}.\text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- $\text{Sig}_{sk}(m)$  : for secret key  $sk$ , message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\Sigma$ , return  $\sigma \leftarrow \text{IBE}.\text{Ext}(sk, m)$ .
- $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(\sigma, m)$  : for public key  $pk$ , signature  $\sigma$ , and message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\Sigma$ , return 1 if  $\text{IBE}.\text{Dec}(\sigma, c) = R$ , for  $c \leftarrow \text{IBE}.\text{Enc}(pk, m, R)$ , for some  $R \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_\Xi$  and “identity”  $m$ , else return 0.

Correctness of  $\Sigma$  follows from the correctness of  $\Xi$ : for all integer  $n$ , for  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ , for all  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , for all  $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig}_{sk}(m)$ , we have that  $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(\sigma, m) = 1$  holds. (Essentially, if  $\sigma$  is a valid signature for  $m$  under  $pk$ , then  $\text{IBE}.\text{Dec}(\sigma, \text{IBE}.\text{Enc}(pk, m, R)) = R$ , for all  $R \in \mathcal{M}_\Xi$ , where  $\mathcal{M}_\Xi$  is defined in  $pk$ .)  $\square$

- **(1 Point)** Apply the Naor transformation to the explicit Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme  $\Xi_{BF}$  with identity and message spaces  $\mathcal{ID}_{BF}$  and  $\mathcal{M}_{BF}$ , respectively, from the lecture. (Assume that a group generator  $g \in \mathcal{G}$  with order  $p$ , a random-oracle instantiation  $\mathsf{H} : \mathcal{ID} \mapsto \mathcal{G}$ , and a suitable pairing  $\mathsf{e} : \mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \mapsto \mathcal{G}_T$  is given as input to all algorithms.)

**Solution:** Set  $\mathcal{M}_\Sigma := \mathcal{ID}_\Xi$ . Further, define

- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$  : return  $(pk, sk) := ((g^x, \mathcal{M}_\Sigma, \mathcal{M}_\Xi), x)$ , for  $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
- $\text{Sig}_{sk}(m)$  : return  $\sigma := \mathsf{H}(m)^x$ .
- $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(\sigma, m)$  : return 1 if  $c_2/\mathsf{e}(c_1, \sigma) = R$ , for  $(c_1, c_2) := (g^y, \mathsf{e}(pk, \mathsf{H}(m))^y \cdot R)$ ,  $y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ , and some  $R \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_\Xi$ , else return 0.

**0.5 bonus points:** define verification algorithm as  $\text{Vrfy}_{pk}(\sigma, m)$  : return 1 if  $\mathsf{e}(g, \sigma) = \mathsf{e}(pk, \mathsf{H}(m))$ , else return 0. (In this case, the description of the IBE message space  $\mathcal{M}_\Xi$  specified in  $pk$  is not needed.)  $\square$

## 2. Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) from Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)

- **(2 Points)** Formally construct an IBE scheme  $\Xi = (\text{IBE}.\text{Gen}, \text{IBE}.\text{Ext}, \text{IBE}.\text{Enc}, \text{IBE}.\text{Dec})$  with identity and messages spaces  $\mathcal{ID}_\Xi$  and  $\mathcal{M}_\Xi$ , respectively, from a CP-ABE scheme  $\Omega = (\text{ABE}.\text{Gen}, \text{ABE}.\text{Ext}, \text{ABE}.\text{Enc}, \text{ABE}.\text{Dec})$  with attribute space  $\mathcal{A}_\Omega$ , policy space  $\mathcal{P}_\Omega$ , and message space  $\mathcal{M}_\Omega$ . Show the correctness of  $\Xi$ .

**Solution:** Set  $\mathcal{ID}_\Xi := \mathcal{A}_\Omega$  and  $\mathcal{M}_\Xi := \mathcal{M}_\Omega$ . Further, define

- $\text{Gen}(1^n)$  : for security parameter  $1^n$ , return  $(pp, sk) \leftarrow \text{ABE}.\text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- $\text{Ext}_{sk}(id)$  : for secret key  $sk$ , “identity”  $id \in \mathcal{ID}_\Xi$ , return  $usk_{id} \leftarrow \text{ABE}.\text{Ext}(sk, id, m)$ .
- $\text{Enc}_{pp}(id, m)$  : for public parameters  $pp$ , identity  $id \in \mathcal{ID}_\Xi$ , and message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\Xi$ , return  $\text{ABE}.\text{Enc}_{pp}(p, m)$ , for policy  $p := id$ .
- $\text{Dec}_{usk_{id}}(c)$  : for user secret key  $usk_{id}$  and ciphertext  $c$ , return  $m \leftarrow \text{ABE}.\text{Dec}_{usk_{id}}(c)$ .

Correctness of  $\Xi$  follows from the correctness of  $\Omega$  in a straightforward way: for all integer  $n$ , for all  $(pp, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ , for all identities  $id \in \mathcal{ID}_\Xi$ , for all  $usk_{id} \leftarrow \text{Ext}_{sk}(id)$ , for all  $m \in \mathcal{M}_\Xi$ , for all  $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pp}(id, m)$ , we have that  $\text{Dec}_{usk_{id}}(c) = m$  holds.  $\square$